In the 1993 N ative Title debate, Geoffrey Blainey sketched a version of the history of black-w hite contact in A ustralia in w hich he sought to cast d oubt on the need for native title legislation. In a series of new spapers articles and the occasional reported speech, Blainey articulated a position on native title which argues that in the course of dispossession m ost A borigines died from disease and that Aboriginal society w ould inevitably decline in the face of the natural planetary spread of superior w estern civilisation. Blainey delivered these view s in su pport of his position that the then federal Labour governm ent w as being too generous to the country's Aborigines in w hat he sees as a guilt-ridden and politically-correct attem pt to make reparation for perceived past WTongs.' In his criticism of the High C ourt M abo decision, Blainey argued that the judges w ere told the w rong story of the past; Blainey's story, presum ably, is the right one. H ere w e have the self-proclaim ed historiographical objectivist accusing supporters of native title of p ropagating a fashionable political-correctness, ignoring the political m otivation w hich inform s his ow n view s-aptly described by H um p h rey M cQueen as 3 the defence of the A ustralian m ining industry.
Whatever may be the evils of society in a state of civilization they are assuredly less in character and degree than those of savage life; and I can never regret that the fair and beautiful country of Tasmania has been entirely reclaimed from the dominion of the debased and treacherous Aborigines; though l cannot but comment that it has been done in part in sad violation of those laws established by Him who hath made of one blood all men to dwell upon the face of the earth. 1 2
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M any A ustralians have little aw areness that historians' interpretations of evidence are, in larger or sm aller degree, influenced by personal values and interests. For m any A ustralians, history is fact, not interpretation. So w hen an historian w ith the profile of Blainey asserts publicly th at m ost A borigines died from disease, and that it was inevitable they w ould be overrun in any case, m any A ustralians will believe th at he is stating historical fact. But as H enry R eynolds and Gillian C ow lishaw have argued, Blainey's position is open to debate, not only in term s of its substantive claims b u t also in term s of w h at Blainey neglects to m ention. In particular, Blainey's em phasis on disease as the m ajor cause of A boriginal deaths, w hile it m ay be statistically correct, deflects attention from the extent of m u rd er as a major cause of deaths. This debate betw een R eynolds and C ow lishaw on the one h and and Blainey on the other is b ut one further episode in the now long-running debate betw een colonial and post-colonial 4 versions of race relations in A ustralia's past.
The historical debate at the national level has been replicated by historians, both am ateur and professional, at the local level. The story of A boriginal dispossession in the Deloraine district of n orthern Tasm ania illustrates this process of selective rem em bering. In the 1890s Daniel Griffen, the journalist son of an Irish im m igrant, recorded in passing the dispossession and w h at he saw as the sad fate of the Pallittorre. In 1964, J. R. Skemp, formerly a science teacher, recognised the reality of dispossession and gave it a place in his short history of the district. More recently, Simon Cubit, a leading advocate of the claims of cattle ow ners and horse riders w ishing to practise their 'traditional' pursuits on the plateau w hich overlooks the D eloraine district, described the process of early British occupation of the M eander district w ith o u t acknow ledging either the prior occupation by the Pallittorre or their resistance to the British invasion. C ubit portrays the stock-keepers and their m asters as 'b o ld ' and 'am bitious', as heroic pioneers involved in a sequential process of occupying the w ilderness and m iraculously transform ing it into productive grazing land. C ubit's approach, w hich typifies the historiography of racial contact in A ustralia from the 1880s until the early 1970s, am ounts to a denial of the existence of the Pallittorre, and hence a distortion of historical truth. This kind of selective am nesia needs to be challenged by a m ore rigorous analysis of the process of colonisation.4 5 My purpose in this pap er is to challenge the historical props on w hich Blainey and others argue against the need for som e form of reparation. I seek to show that blackw hite relations in Van D iem en's Land, and especially in Pallittorre country, w ere more complex and problem atic than Blainey's over-generalised explanations recognise. I argue that A borigines sought to resolve disputes in w ays in w hich violent contact w as limited, and that they used the threat of force as a major w eapon. In contrast, the British regularly practised prom iscuous m assacre, a practice fuelled by the belief that in relations w ith A borigines force w as necessary. These argum ents involve not only the question of how A borigines died b u t also the thinking, both black and w hite, w hich informed the various uses of force. I argue also that notions of the British invasion and subsequent A boriginal deaths as inevitable outcom es of broad historical forces are little more than figm ents of conservative historical im aginations, m ost notably those of John West and Geoffrey Blainey. More to the point, Blainey's argum ents, and W est's, are contrived to deny the proposition that historical actors choose and execute courses of action for w hich they m ust bear responsibility. 4 Reynolds 1993, p. 19; Cowlishaw 1993, pp. 15 and 24. 5 Griffen 1893-4, p39. Griffen's pieces were first published in 1893-94 in the Launceston D aily Telegraph; Skemp 1964 , pp. 10-11, Cubit, 1987 Hartwig, 1971 , pp. 9-24.
Resisting the invader
In the fo llo w in g analysis o f P a llitto rre re la tio n s w ith the B ritis h colonists I have used Rhys Isaac's e th n o g ra p h ic approach o f d isce rn in g h is to ric a l actors' in te n tio n s and m o tiv a tio n s fro m th e ir re p o rte d actions. E th n o g ra p h ic analysis a llo w s the h is to ria n to im a g in a tiv e ly enter in to the circum stances and perhaps m e n ta lity o f h is to ric a l actors w h o have le ft no w ritte n records. The m e th o d requires th a t re p o rte d b e h a vio u rs, w h ic h are regarded as action-statem ents, be u n d erstood in the co n te xt o f the c u ltu ra l assum ptions and values the h is to ric a l actors in question w ere lik e ly to have a p p lie d in the reported situ a tio n . F u rth e r, situ a tio n s or in cid e n ts u n d e rsto o d in th is w a y sh o u ld be recu rre n t inciden ts w h ic h can be seen as ty p ic a l or even s y m b o lic o f re la tio n s betw een com p e tin g c u ltu ra l groups, in this case in d ig e n o u s people in Tasm On the n ig h t o f 22 June 1827, K n ig h t and H u rlin g w e re s ittin g in th e ir stock-hut. The hut's fireplace sm oked a great deal th a t n ig h t, a fact w h ic h irrita te d K n ig h t. D enied the sm all c o m fo rt o f a b la z in g fire on a cold w in te r's n ig h t, K n ig h t rem arked to H u rlin g , K n ig h t and H u rlin g w ere w o rk in g some th ir ty yards fro m th e ir hu t. They had felled a tree fo r fire w o o d and w ere engaged in lo p p in g its branches. D espite b e in g o n ly th irty yards fro m th e ir h u t, K n ig h t and H u r lin g had taken th e ir m uskets w ith them , a lth o u g h w hen ra in began to fa ll they re tu rn e d the m uskets to the h u t. D is re g a rd in g the ra in , the tw o men re tu rn e d to th e ir w o rk . A creek, its banks protected b y a clu ste r o f tea tree brush, flo w e d past the fro n t o f th e ir hu t. U n k n o w n to them , a g ro u p o f P a llitto rre were h id in g in the brush. In due tim e, a cco rd in g to H u rlin g , 'a n u m b e r o f b lack n a tiv e people rushed in to the h u t and to o k possession o f it'. A rm e d w ith hatchets and p ro te c tin g th e ir heads w ith th e ir arm s, K n ig h t and H u r lin g m oved to w a rd s the h u t b u t w e re m e t b y a h a il o f spears. One o f the spears, th ro w n b y a ta ll black m an, stru ck K n ig h t in the le ft shoulder. K n ig h t p u lle d the spear fro m his sh o u ld e r and as he d id so w a v e d his hands f ' Isaac 1982, pp. 323-29. Depositions concerning the death of W illia m K night, 1827,1/316, C hief Secretary's Office, Hobart. Unless otherwise indicated the in fo rm a tio n in the fo llo w in g section is d ra w n from these depositions. Four statements were given to P.A. M ulgrave, police m agistrate at Launceston, between 26-30 June 1827. The statements were given by a police constable, a soldier, an overseer of convicts and an assigned convict.
• ' maps, 1826-28. to H u rlin g . H u rlin g , s u p p o sin g th a t K n ig h t m eant h im to ru n fro m the attackers, ran onto the adjacent p la in , w h ic h was ankle deep in w ater, and to w a rd s G ibson's h u t, some three m iles to the south-east, in search o f help. K n ig h t s lo w ly fo llo w e d H u rlin g , b u t about 200 yards fro m the h u t, tw o o r three blacks knocked K n ig h t d o w n . In lin e w ith the practice fo llo w e d b y o th e r Tasm anian A b o rig in e s, the P a llitto rre k ille d K n ig h t b y beating h im a ro u n d the head w ith w addies. They also used a ga rd e n hoe. The blacks then re tu rn e d K n ig h t's b o d y to w ith in fifte e n yards o f his hut. A rope m ade o f n a tiv e grasses w as used to d ra g the b o d y, w h ic h had a black m a rk a ro u n d its neck, fro m the p la in to the hut. The rope w as la te r fo u n d b y w h ite s at the blacks' camp. W h e n K n ig h t's b o d y w as fo u n d b y H u r lin g and some others, it was on its back, the legs w e re crossed, one arm w as u n d e r the head and the o th e r u n d e r a side, and a d a rk c o lo u re d co tto n h a n d ke rch ie f covered the face. K n ig h t u s u a lly ke p t this h a n d k e rc h ie f in h is ka n g a ro o skin cap, w h ic h w as ly in g on the g ro u n d near his head w ith some b lo o d in it.
3 9 5 8 2 *lW h ile K n ig h t w as m e e tin g his fate, ab o u t tw e n ty b lacks p u rsu e d H u r lin g across the p la in to the edge o f the forest. Just p rio r to e n te rin g the forest, H u r lin g tu rn e d
and faced a black, w h o w as arm ed w ith a spear in each hand, s ta n d in g some ten to fifteen yards aw ay. H u r lin g th re w his hatchet th ro u g h the air. The w ea p on h it it's m a rk, k n o c k in g the black to the g ro u n d . In te n t on fleeing his attackers, H u rlin g decided his chances w ere better w ith o u t his boots, w h ic h w ere too b ig fo r his feet. H e unlaced them and th re w them off, re c a llin g later he fe lt he co u ld no lo n g e r ru n w ith th e m on. A n k le deep w a te r w o u ld n o t have helped. By n o w there w e re ab o u t tw e n ty blacks w ith in th irty yards o f H u rlin g , a ll arm ed w ith spears. As he ran, several spears w ere th ro w n at Pallittorre were nowhere to be seen. Williams observed both large and small barefoot foot prints, indicating both adults and children were in the Pallittorre party. Smith estimated 30 people; their footmarks 'were all over the Garden like the footmarks of so many Cattle'. The whites returned to Gibson's hut. The following day, Sunday 24 June, Shiners, Williams and Lingan, accompanied by Baker and White, set off in pursuit of the Pallittorre. About two in the afternoon Shiners noticed the smoke of a fire which he judged to be near Laycock's Falls, some five miles west of Gibson's hut. Arriving at the falls about an hour before sundown, the pursuers hid in a hollow tree some 400 yards from the blacks' camp. Two blacks, armed with spears, stood guard, suggesting an expectation of revenge.
The British response to Knight's death suggests they adapted their military practice to a form of guerrilla warfare. Between seven and eight o'clock the whites crept to within 40 yards of the blacks' camp. Six fires were burning. Three were close together, and the other three 14 to 15 yards away. About 30 blacks and a num ber of dogs were at the first clustering of three fires. Without calling out and under the cover of darkness, the whites, with pistols blazing, rushed the Pallittorre camp. A 'great num ber of black native people' ran from their camp and 'immediately disappeared amongst some scrub and ferns'. No blacks cried out. Like other Tasmanian Aborigines, the Pallittorre were quick to incorporate British hunting dogs into their hunting practices. As the Pallittorre fled in to the night at Laycock's Falls, their dogs attacked their assailants. Throughout the course of the night the whites shot upwards of 25 of these dogs. The evidence makes no mention of any intention to take prisoners. Williams, Shiners and their accomplices 9 were intent on reprisal, not on implementing the rule of law. Both Williams and Shiners were at pains to point out they had not called out prior to their attack. This was significant because in British military tradition, surprise ambushes were considered to be dishonourable. This, however, was a silent war, unannounced in the immediacy of its execution, requiring great patience and cunning in the quest for advantage.
Next morning, no black bodies could be found, although Williams saw tracks of blood near the fires. He was quite sure at least one black had been shot. He traced the track of blood over two logs; between the logs he saw 'the prints of naked hum an feet, close to the track of blood'. In contrast, Shiners did 'not think that any of them had been M See Neal 1991, pp. 17-18, 58, 78-80, for a discussion of the non-application of the rule of law to Aborigines in New South Wales prior to 1860. A n in fo rm a n t called P unch to ld R obinson th a t K n ig h t deserved to be k ille d because he 'used to k ill the natives fo r s p o rt1 ." U s in g the d e p o sitio n s taken b y M u lg ra v e , w e can discern at least tw o o th e r specific reasons fo r the P a llitto rre attack on K n ig h t's h u t: to 'p lu n d e r' the h u t, ta k in g some o f the contents and d e s tro y in g others; and to scare H u rlin g aw ay. So the P a llitto rre had v e ry specific reasons fo r the ritu a l k illin g o f K n ig h t.
B ut the location o f K n ig h t's death in a p p ro p ria te w id e r contexts a llo w s a deeper u n d e rsta n d in g o f the P a llitto rre m o tiv a tio n fo r k illin g h im . In p a rtic u la r, the b ro a d e r context o f the Black W a r in V an D ie m e n 's L and, and p rio r re la tio n s w ith E uropeans liv in g in P a llitto rre c o u n try are a p p ro p ria te contexts; and K n ig h t's k illin g also needs to A concerted resistance occurred across the Central North during late Spring and early Summer of 1827. At least 19 separate incidents occurred in this period, including nine incidents between 10-24 November. At least eight whites were killed, in addition to spearings, other woundings and general harrassments. Huts were plundered and burnt, and at least 100 sheep were killed at the Lake River."1 Between 2-7 December,
Map 3: Occupation of Aboriginal Land to the late 1820s, Van Diemen's Land.
several travellers w ere harrassed on the Launceston to H o b a rt Road. B ut w h e n w e exam ine relations betw een the P a llitto rre and the stock-keepers liv in g in th e ir c o u n try p rio r to K n ig h t's death, w e gain a m ore substantial in s ig h t in to the local c o n te x t fo r K n ig h t's k illin g and the n a tu re o f the vio le n ce w h ic h characterised the c o n flic t. A series o f incidents, in v o lv in g P a llitto rre a tte m p ts at n e g o tia tio n , ra id s on stock-huts, the th e ft o f w o m e n and c h ild re n , and k illin g s o f blacks preceded K n ig h t's death. death K n ig h t to ld H u rlin g th a t he had 'fa lle n in w ith some natives and fire d a t th e m , and th a t three spears w h ic h he had b ro u g h t hom e w ith h im , had been th ro w n at h im '.
H u rlin g 's account o f the in fo rm a tio n related to h im b y K n ig h t suggests th a t K n ig h t w as the aggressor in th is in cid e n t. N o o th e r in fo rm a tio n co n ce rn in g th is in c id e n t is a va ila b le .
It is ve ry lik e ly K n ig h t's death w as related to these e a rlie r incidents. M o re g e n e ra lly , the th e ft o f w o m e n and c h ild re n m ay have persuaded the P a llitto rre to take revenge on The P a llitto rre p u n is h m e n t o f W illia m K n ig h t w as also a lm o st c e rta in ly in response to an in c id e n t ju st eleven days p rio r to th e ir attack on Sim pson's hut. O n 12 June, some flour, w hich they used to m ake dam per, all the knives, an axe, tw o pairs of sheep shears, a pair of scissors, a tom ahaw k, som e g u n p o w d er and all the tin pots. They also took aw ay 30 or 40 kangaroo skins. Clearly, the Pallittorre w anted Baker to leave. They had not com e to kill him , b u t to collect paym ents ow ing, to frighten him into leaving and to reduce his capacity to continue colonising their land.
Two m arkedly different strategies w ere pu rsu ed by the protagonists. The Pallittorre sought to threaten transgressors of expected reciprocal arrangem ents, either to procure paym ents due or to induce the colonists to leave, rather than engage in direct conflict; the colonists ignored reciprocal expectations and practised the m assacre in response to A boriginal threats. Baker's version of the story has him self escaping from the blacks. I contend that the Pallittorre allow ed Baker to escape. Their business w as not to kill him, nor did they respond im pulsively to Baker's action. W hatever their feeling about Baker, the Pallittorre felt no im m ediate need to leave the district, nor to conceal them selves, suggesting they felt no further threat from Baker, at least not in the im m ediate future. This interpretation is su separate incidents occurred th e re / including one near the A venue in w hich 300 sheep w ere clubbed to death. The A venue plain had been 'for countless generations the favorite hunting ground of large tribes of natives, ow ing to the plentifulness of game, kangaroo and w allaby ab o u n d in g from the Blackamoor to the R u b ico n '/ These tactics w ere m et w ith w h at only can be described as a series of m ass m urders. In July 1830, for exam ple, the Pallittorre attacked som e stock-keepers and successfully drove them away. Soon afterw ards, the Pallittorre leader Q uam by, along w ith several others, w as killed." At M iddle Plains (Map 2), also in July 1830, 'Lyons and som e others fell in w ith a tribe of natives and drove them into a small lagoon and shot several, and from there they drove them to the foot of Ritchie's Sugarloaf and shot all the others except an old m an and a w om an w ho begged for m ercy and w ere suffered to go aw ay '. H enry H ellyer, the Van Diem en's Land C om pany chief surveyor, told Robinson that in 1830 a stock-keeper called Paddy H eagon living at the Retreat, som e tw o miles east of the future Deloraine 24 tow nship, shot nineteen blacks w ith a sw ivel gun charged w ith nails.* O 'C onnor told the A borigines C om m ittee that 'C aptain Ritchie's [stock-]men, to the w estw ard of " Shaw (edj 1971, p 
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N orfolk Plains, used to h u n t them on horseback, and shoot them from their horses.' Punch told Robinson that several natives w ere shot by either M urphy or M urray and tw o others at the Long Swam p. Punch felt that these m en w ere excessively cruel and that 'in this case they o ught to be p u n ish e d '."6
The Pallittorre continued to respond to these assaults w ith retribution spearings, which w ere not intended to kill, and w ith raids on stock-huts. One such attack w as m ade on a sto ck -h u t at Dairy Plains (M ap 2) occupied by Thom as Johnson and Dolly Dalrym ple. This incident has been w ritten about several times. Dolly is usually presented as heroically resisting a vicious and cow ardly assault by a large nu m b er of blacks." A six hour siege is reported to have occurred, and Dolly's heroism is frequently m arvelled at because she w as a w om an and because she w as a 'half-caste', the dau g h ter of an English sailor and an Aboriginal w om an w hom the sailor had abducted. These racist and sexist interpretations alw ays fail to locate the blacks' attack on Dolly's hut w ithin the w ider black-w hite relations in the district. On this occasion the blacks speared Dolly's d au g h ter in the thigh, and they set fire to the hut. W hile there can be little d oubt that the attackers w ere in a m ean m ood and that in all probability Dolly acted w ith great bravery, the interpretations of this incident alw ays seek to 'heroineise' Dolly and 'cow ardise' the blacks.
The Pallittorre also regularly harrassed Cubit. In Septem ber 1831 C ubit w alked from his h u t at Stocker's Plain (Map 2) to collect w ater from a nearby spring. Local legend has it that 'som e score or m ore of spears' w ere throw n at him. C ubit 'b eat a hasty retreat' to his h u t b u t received eight w ounds, none fatal, along the way. The blacks m ade a 'long and determ ined attack' on the h ut b u t a stockm an there 'sh o t several of them, and the rem ainder fled to the m ountains'. O ther A borigines w ho frequented the district ap parently w earied of the struggle. Sometime in 1830, in response to A rthur's offer of a free pard o n to any convict w ho could 'conciliate' Aborigines, John Benfield approached three blacks. H e offered them bread and, pu ttin g aside his gun as requested by the blacks, w as led to a place beyond D unorlan (Map 2). From here Benfield took a larger group to the local m ilitary party; Benfield subsequently received his pardon. This report suggests that these blacks sent out three of their num ber to m eet Benfield for the purpose of m aking arangem ents to 'com e in '. Lack of food and w eariness of the struggle, or perhaps an unw illingness to engage in the struggle, w ere reasons w hy m any A boriginal groups subm itted to the invader. Perhaps the brutality and extent of the killings in Pallittorre country also induced these particular blacks to 'com e in '."s
Attitudes to the use of force
In the second half of the 1820s, both A borigines and colonists in Van D iem en's Land adopted practices designed to induce fear and terror in the hearts and m inds of their respective enemies. But, as I suggested above, the m ethods used by the tw o groups to induce fear and terror differed considerably. The A borigines w ere far m ore im aginative in their use of force than w ere the British, using different m ethods to achieve different The evidence for the Pallittorre suggests they never believed that violent killing, or even lesser expressions of force, w ere necessary or even desirable in their relations w ith the colonisers. As Punch told Robinson 'w h en he first cam e the natives w as very peaceable, but they have been drove to com m it outrages on the w hites by reason of the 30 dire atrocities first com m itted upon them '.' The evidence prior to the K night killing suggests they sought to negotiate a reciprocal arrangem ent w ith Knight. In their ten years of relations w ith the British, durin g w hich time m any of their people w ere killed, the Pallittorre killed only two w hites.31 O n m any occasions they could have killed colonists, but did not. The am bush and killing of W illiam K night w as a prem editated retribution prom pted by several factors, both local and non-local, as argued above. On m ost occasions, P allittorre hostility involved theft or property dam age, or attem pts to induce colonists to leave, not the killing of colonists. Given that less than 2500 colonists w ere killed by A borigines A ustralia-w ide, the Pallittorre approach to the use of force seem s to have been w idespread across A ustralia. A nd although colonists w ere killed, never did A boriginal violence in Van D iem en's Land come to resem ble the often unprovoked prom iscuous violence practised by the British. This w as not a question of 'prim itive' w eaponry (captured guns w ere not used against the colonists), or of lacking the tactical skill-the record show s A borigines w ere skilful, creative and w itty in their 29 Ryan 1981, ch. 7; Reynolds 1982, pp. 103-110 O ne prevailing tendency in the historiography of Tasm anian A borigines is to assert that the A borigines w ere experiencing som e kind of slow strangulation of their intelligence at the tim e of the British invasion. Rhys Jones w as the m odern populariser of this social-D arw inist notion, and it has m anifested itself in a num ber of w ays both 34 before and after Jones presented his thesis in the film The Last Tasmanian.' A long w ith the m yth that A borigines becam e extinct w ith the death of T ruganini in 1876, this strangulation m yth has been and still is a m ajor factor in the oppression of T asm anian Aborigines. In this regard it is im p o rtan t to stress the tactical innovation dem onstrated by Van D iem en's Land A borigines in their responses to the British invaders. Failure to do so not only encourages the contem porary survival of the strangulation m yth, it runs the risk of depicting A borigines in early colonial Tasm ania as captives of the topography and their cultural traditions. The issue of A boriginal adeptness at guerrilla w arfare is a case in point. C ertainly the topography, the process of gradual occupation by the British, and the w eapons preferred by the A borigines m eant guerrilla w arfare w as an obvious option, b u t w e should be w ary of the proposition that guerrilla w arfare w as a 'natural' developm ent, that A borigines took to guerrilla w arfare as a fish takes to w ater. Such an assertion tends to im ply that the choice to use tactics w hich historians have conceptualised as guerrilla w arfare w ere not conscious choices, b u t rather som ething which Aborigines did 'n atu rally '.3b C ertainly they w orked to harness advantages available to them , b u t w e need to recognise and acknow ledge that creative and intelligent choices w ere m ade. C haracterisations such as Jones' notion of strangulation m ay be unw ittingly supported by interpretations about the n atu re of the A boriginal m ilitary response to the British invasion. R eynolds suggests th at m any Aboriginal groups m oved from 'feud to 37 w arfare' in their relations w ith the British.' In general term s this m odel does describe a broad m ovem ent that did occur. There are three problem s, how ever, associated w ith this term. One is that it can be interpreted as m eaning that the Van D iem en's Land A borigines w ere slow to discard responses based on traditional practices; tw o, the term fails to explain w hy the shift occurred; and three, the term fails to recognise that some groups w ho m et colonisers for the first tim e in the mid 1820s, such as the Pallittorre, m oved m uch m ore quickly into the w arfare m ode than other groups. The m ost vigorous and organised resistance in Van D iem en's Land coincided w ith the rush of occupation in the second half of the 1820s. Until that time, m any A boriginal groups preferred to negotiate solutions, largely on the basis of reciprocity, rather than engage in conflict. N ot until the m assive escalation of sheep and colonisers in the mid-1820s did w arfare develop. Also, the decline in population levels induced survivors to come together, thus creating the im pression of a late organisation. This im pression tends to obscure the point " that although the conflict intensified in the late 1820s, reflecting an ap p aren t transition from 'feud to w arfare', the tactics used und erw en t refinem ent rather than m ajor change du rin g the 1820s. A boriginal hostility, although m ore organised in the late 1820s, rem ained linked to the retribution process, to attem pts to drive the colonists aw ay, collect d u e paym ents or acquire food. The Pallittorre experience suggests it took them little tim e to realise they w ere involved in an open-ended conflict w ith their invaders. After they confronted Baker, for exam ple, they rem ained in the im m ediate vicinity of his hut, leaving them easy targets for the reprisal that night. At that tim e, they saw that having enacted retribution, that particular m atter w as closed. But they learned very quickly that this w as not the case. After they killed Knight, som e ten days later, they travelled som e five miles from the scene of the killing and posted sentries to detect evidence of p ursu it.38
O ne tactic w hich has not been em phasised as m uch as it m ight have been is that of the threat of force, a tactic closely related to the production of fear in the enemy.
Reynolds cites one exam ple of this tactic and Ryan in several instances refers to the
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A boriginal intent to intim idate the colonists/ b u t in m y view it deserves greater em phasis. Incidence of the threat of force, a less tangible tactic than the others discussed by Reynolds, needs to be discerned from the ethnographic record. The record for Van D iem en's Land in the late 1820s show s the existence of considerable British fear. D uring the m ilitary operation know n as the black line, in Septem ber 1830, for exam ple, the governm ent's decision to begin the line below Launceston provoked both fear and outrage in Launceston and su rro u n d in g districts. A colonist at George Town, some thirty miles north of Launceston, reported seeing a tribe of som e 600-700 A borigines 40 preparin g to attack Launceston. At the tim e there w ere less than 300 A borigines still living on the entire island, although the general belief w as that som e 2,000 w ere still 'at large'. This capacity for fear reflects the colonists' sense of vulnerability, a vulnerability born of their ow n perception of A borigines as treacherous savages as well as the A boriginal capacity to induce fear. But w as British fear m erely an outcom e of the conflict, and not an outcom e deliberately pursu ed by the Aborigines? We need to be careful not to deny the possibility that A borigines deliberately decided to use the threat of force and the attend an t generation of fear as a pow erful w eapon in their w ar against the British, that A borigines w ere creative agents in m oulding the shape of the conflict, not m erely ad hoc responders acting w ithin param eters set by the topography, the British and their ow n cultural traditions.
Several incidents suggests that A borigines in Van D iem en's Land used the threat of force as a major w eapon in their struggle against the British. Ryan relates an incident at Eastern M arshes, near O atlands, in O ctober 1824, in w hich 150 Aborigines, accom panied by 50 dogs, divided into groups, su rro u n d ed a stock hut, threw spears and stones, and finally surrounded the h u t w ith fires. Despite a siege lasting in excess of five hours, the two servants w ho occupied the h u t 'escaped'.41 This incident represents far m ore than a desire to acquire provisions; occurring at the beginning of the Black W ar, it can be read as a symbolic incident, a display of a range of weapons in a configuration of confinement but exercised primarily as intimidation, dem onstrating to the colonists at large that the threat of force and its attendant fear were to become a fact of daily life. The Pallittorre adopted similar tactics. In addition to the Baker incident, twenty or thirtv Pallittorre chased John Hurling from the site of Knight's killing, throwing spears at him, all of which missed. In both cases, the Pallittorre threatened the two colonists with force; in neither case was the colonist actually assaulted. These threats of force, read as statements of intent, suggest the Pallittorre wished to convey to the colonists not merelv a desire to have them leave, but to frighten them and other potential invaders, to create 42 in the minds of colonists a perm anent state of fear.
Other tactics also were designed to induce fear. In the summer of 1827-28 the sudden appearance, after long periods of absence, and open hostility shown by the Luggermairrernerpairrer and Lairmairremener bands of the Big River tribe, the southern neighbours of the Pallittorre, caused panic among the colonists. The decision of the Lairmairremener to split up and work in two adjacent areas along the Ouse and upper Derwent Rivers gave 'the impression of combined strategy'. At other times, constant movement and sudden attacks in unexpected places made capture difficult, thereby keeping fear levels high. There are num erous reports of Aborigines telling raided colonists they would be back to get them. In December 1829, for example, the Lairmairremener robbed huts near New Norfolk. They speared a settler and took his two pistols; they did not kill him, but told him 'we will give it to you'.44 The taking in raids of guns and knives, although there are no reports of those weapons being used in Van Diemen's Land, would almost certainly have enhanced British fear. These tactics produced fear amongst the colonists; such tactics were shaped by the traditional movements of those bands and the local topography, but were also the results of decisions, consciously taken, to induce terror amongst the colonists. Fear was not simply the outcome of tangible tactics; it was also the outcome of an Aboriginal policy of terror. The threat of force, and the fear such threats engendered, rather than tangible violence itself, was a major, if not the major weapon used.
The savagery of the British reaction to Aboriginal hostility has several explanations. Fear, racial hatred and the Aboriginal resistance certainly contributed to that over-reaction; but given the 'peaceable' disposition of the Pallittorre and many other Aboriginal bands in Van Diemen's Land, can such factors account for the ferocious nature of British violence? At least two writers have suggested that colonial powers have seen racial others as inherently criminal and necessarily productive of social chaos. Winthrop Jordan suggests that free African Negroes in America were seen to be potentially if not actually in a state of insurrection. Barry Morris recently argued that force was seen by colonists as a necessary part of black-white contact in colonial New South Wales; this perception was prom pted and legitimated by constructions of Aborigines, based on real and imagined fears, as treacherous savages always likely to undermine the colonising effort. The perception that force was necessary pointed to an inherent instability of British power in colonial situations, giving rise to a culture of Several prom inent colonists w ho assessed the conflict betw een black and w hite argued th at force w as necessary in dealing w ith Aborigines. A rgum ents for force often drew links w ith perceived Aboriginal savagery and the need for force. In an analysis of the potential value of the black line, the Launceston Advertiser ow ner and editorialist John Pascoe Faw kner argued that the capture of the blacks 'cannot be achieved w ithout bloodshed'-the ability of the blacks to d isappear into the bush and avoid apprehension m eant that force w as necessary if they w ere to be contained. The only w ay to prevent
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'their deadly incursions' w as 'by shooting a few of them '. Colonists giving evidence to the Aborigines' C om m ittee believed th at force w as necessary. Roderick O 'C onnor, for exam ple, th o u g h t it 'im possible to su ppress them by open force'; the A borigines should be fought not openly b u t in a silent w ar m arked by the genocidal am bush. O 'C onnor advocated 'som e of the w orst characters w ould be the best to send after them ', citing a colonist called D ouglas Ibbens w ho had killed half the eastern tribe 'by creeping upon them and firing am ongst them w ith his double-barrelled gun'.48 John W est also felt that force w as necessary to subjugate the Van D iem en's Land 'savages'. In 1852, W est w rote that the consequences of the occupation for indigenous people are of little concern because the 'original occupation of this country necessarily involved m ost of the consequences w hich follow ed'. Like the 1830 A borigines' Com m ittee, W est blam ed the convicts for inflicting death and destruction on the Aborigines. But in W est's view the A borigines them selves w ere chiefly to blam e, since as savages they w ere unable to com prehend the law s of civilisation: 'the barbarian that cannot com prehend laws or authority. David Neal has recently shown that in New South Wales the rule of law was not applied in order to protect A borigines/' the same is the case for Van Diemen's Land. Arthur's governorship is marked by a failure to prosecute the many recorded massacres perpetrated against Aborigines by parties of colonists including police and soldiers, the revenge massacre for William Knight's death being but one example. This failure suggests Arthur believed force was necessary. Bronwyn Desailly has convincingly shown that the British government was prepared to condone the use of force to suppress Aborigines who challenged the British occupation, although it sought to conceal such condonem ent/" It is not surprising then, that from the time Aborigines began to seriously threaten the British invasion of their hunting grounds, Arthur's policy reads as 53 a sequence of measures involving the forceful repression of Aboriginal resistance.' In the late 1820s Arthur actually adopted a formal policy of terrorising the Aborigines out of the 'settled districts', a policy which sought to move between the threat and the use of force. It makes no difference, as Shaw has argued, that Arthur may have been powerless to stop atrocities against Aborigines-the point is that his policy both facilitated and encouraged atrocities such as those committed against the Pallittorre. Reynold's most recent work suggests that Arthur himself was aware of th is/5 * One outcome of seeking to generalise about the causes of Aboriginal deaths on an Australia-wide basis, or even a colony-by-colony basis, is that experience at the local level can be obscured. What use is a generalised view if it does not accord with the record of evidence in specific places? History is as much, if not more so, about the particular as the general. A generalised view, if it is to aspire to validity, m ust follow detailed investigation of local places; it must reflect regional variations and similarities, not subvert them to a general view. The dangers for the integrity of historical scholarship inherent in generalised versions of early colonial conflict are exacerbated when high-profile historians seek to popularise comfortable and sanitised general versions. Death by disease is no doubt a less culpable notion than death by violence for a clientele enamoured of a celebratory version of Australia's past.
The discussion above shows that Blainey's assertion that disease was responsible for most Aboriginal deaths simplifies and distorts the wider story of Aboriginal deaths in the wake of colonisation. While agreeing that disease and other factors, all linked to colonisation, were responsible for most Aboriginal deaths, Reynolds asserts" that between 1788 and the 1930s at least 20,000 Aborigines in Australia were killed by whites or their agents, some of whom were native police. Plomley argues that in Van Diemen's Land, starvation caused by the British occupation of hunting grounds was one significant cause of Aboriginal deaths. The importance of local studies lies in recognising that different factors contributed to most deaths in different places. In many places, certainly in Tasmania, it is not possible to tell how many Aborigines were killed, 5 1 Neal 1991 , pp. 17-8, 58, 78-80. 52 Desailly 1977 , ch. 3. 53 Robson 1983 , pp. 210-20. 54 Desailly 1977 , ch. 3. 55 Reynolds 1995 how m any died from disease, or how m any died from starvation. A ccording to the historical record, the chief cause of A boriginal deaths in Pallittorre country w as the prom iscuous massacre. Evidence th at disease had lesser im pact than killing in Pallittorre country w as the ability of those not killed to rem ain healthy. As late as 1834 Robinson w as told by an unnam ed Aboriginal w om an w ho only very recently had been living w ith the Pallittorre th at there w ere p len ty ' of blackfellas still in the district. Reports of raids for food on colonists' properties at C hudleigh, in the w est of Pallittorre country, corroborate the w om an's evidence. 8 In any case, as Reynolds has pointed out, the im portan t point from the perspective of national debate about w hite A ustralia's obligations to A borigines in the w ake of native title is not how m any died from w hat cause, b u t asserting that disease accounted for m ost and neglecting to em phsise the extent of killing-the course Blainey chose durin g the native title debate-distorts the reality of contact violence.38 As I am arguing, this distortion is further exaggerated by national versions of the past w hich do not allow for local variations.
Irresistible inevitability and human agency
In his The Invasion of America, Francis Jennings60 used the term 'the conquest m yth' to characterise colonial justifications of indigenous dispossession w hich em phasise the inevitability of the process. A ccording to this m yth, savagery and civilisation w ere opposites, the natives incapable of civilisation and hence full hum anity, the colonists ennobled in their contest w ith the dark pow ers of the w ilderness'. Savages w ere creatures of the w ilderness and w ould alw ays rem ain so, w hereas the civilised w ere 'required by divine sanction or the im perative of progress to conquer the w ilderness and m ake it a garden'. F undam entally, all prescriptions contained w ithin the m yth w ere in som e w ay fated -as Jennings puts it, 'it w as all inevitable'. As a m eans of rationalising the gruesom e reality of A boriginal dispossession, various elem ents of the conquest m yth w ere re-inforced d u rin g the early decades of the British occupation of Tasm ania. A borigines w ere routinely perceived as objects of savagery, if not the m ost uncivilised savages on earth. In the early 1850s, the conquest m yth w as popularly articulated in Tasm ania by the Launceston-based preacher, editor and historian John W est.61 W est's view s on the inevitability of conquest are im portant in this story. W est w as an im m ensely influential journalist and preacher in northern Tasm ania during the 1840s and 1850s.6' His view s provide verification that the conquest m yth w as afoot in Van D iem en's Land, and his contribution to racist ideology, at least in Tasm ania, has been considerable. W est found th at the occupation of A boriginal land in Van Diem en's Land w as just in the follow ing terms:
The right of w an d erin g hordes to engross vast regions forever to retain exclusive property in the soil, and w hich w ould feed m illions w here h u n d red s are scattered-can never be m aintained. The laws of increase seem to suggest the right of m igration: neither nations nor individuals are bo u n d to tarry on one spot, and die. The assum ption of sovereignty over a savage people is justified by necessity-S K Plomley 1966 , p. 903. w Jennings 1975 th a t law , w h ic h gives to strength the c o n tro l o f weakness. It p re v a ils e ve ryw h e re : it m ay be eith e r m a lig n a n t or benevolent, b u t it is irre sistib le .'1 3
Three closely related id e o lo g ica l p o sitio ns in fo rm W est's ju s tific a tio n o f occupation.
W est argues firs tly in Lockean term s64 th a t the Taws o f increase seem to suggest the rig h t o f m ig ra tio n '. M ig ra tio n fo r W est is in fact necessary, fo r w ith o u t it b o th in d iv id u a ls and nations w ill perish. Secondy, the o ccu p a tio n is ju s tifie d b y the s o c ia l-D a rw in is t la w w h ic h 'gives to s tre n g th the co n tro l o f weakness'. T his la w p re v a ils e ve ryw h e re , its m oral im p lic a tio n s b e in g co in cid e n ta l to its u b iq u ity . T h ird ly , W est w ro te th a t it 'is not in the nature o f c iv ilis a tio n to exalt the savage'; the re la tio n o f the savage to the w h ite (West's w o rd ) 'can o n ly be th a t o f an alien, a slave'.63 Three n a tu ra l la w s then, those of increase, the do m in a n ce o f the stro n g o ve r the w eak, and the in c o rrig ib ility o f the racial savage, render in e v ita b le a ju s t and necessary occu p a tio n o f A b o rig in a l land. These are law s w h ic h im p e l and dicta te b ro a d h is to ric a l forces w h ic h h u m a n society is o b lig e d to accept, indeed m u s t accept because th e y are irre sistib le . In p a rt, W est w as re s p o n d in g to a w id e ly fe lt am bivalence in the 1830s and 1840s a b o u t B ritis h presence in the co lo n y and the im p lic a tio n s o f th a t presence fo r the isla n d 's A b o rig in a l p o p u la tio n . W.P.
W eston, fo r exam ple, spoke fo r m a n y colonists w h e n he w ro te W hatever m a y be the evils o f society in a state o f c iv iliz a tio n th e y are assuredly less in character and degree than those o f savage life ; and I can never re g re t that the fa ir and b e a u tifu l c o u n try o f Tasm ania has been e n tire ly reclaim ed fro m the on A boriginal ow nership of land is reinforcing culture. In th at sense, it is a backw ard step.57
The inevitability argum ent operates on tw o levels, the inevitability of the occupation itself, and the inevitability of A boriginal deaths once the occupation had occurred. The arg u m en t that historical processes inducing the inevitability of invasion m ight be at w ork is su pported by som e superficial evidence. Five thousand years of invasions and alm ost continuous w ar suggest an entrenched desire to dom inate others. But the issue is m ore com plex and problem atic th an either W est or Blainey allow. Robert King has argued, for exam ple that im portant strategic, trade and social factors figured prom inently in a long-running debate w hich culm inated in the occupation of A boriginal A ustralia. A nd recently Allan Frost has argued that the British occupation of A ustralia w as p art of a British Board of Trade plan to establish a global free trade netw ork.68 Such choices challenge the notion of hu m an society im pelled to act by instincts beyond its control. Once again Blarney's historical m ethod reduces a set of complex processes to sim plified generalisation.
W est asserts that occupation 'necessarily involved m ost of the consequences w hich follow';69 not only w as the invasion necessary and just, so too w ere the consequences w hich followed! Is such a view beyond dispute? If w e accept the view that the bulk of colonists th o u g h t force w as a necessary, it w as m ore or less inevitable that m any Aborigines w ould die violent deaths, although there are m any exam ples of colonists w ho w ere able to enjoy relatively harm onious relations w ith Aborigines, prim arily w hen control of land w as not an issue. Ryan show s, for exam ple, that relations betw een A borigines and sealers along the north coast of Van D iem en's Land in the early years of the nineteenth century w ere in som e respects m utually beneficial and certainly more 70 harm onious than those w ith agriculturalists an d graziers from about 1810 onw ards. The ap p aren t ability of individuals such as Punch to co-exist w ith the Pallittorre also 71 show s th at conflict and death w ere not inevitable. In any case, neither the arg u m en t for the inevitability of invasion, nor the belief that force w as a necessity, should obscure the fact th at in m any cases of m assacre, actions followed prem editated decisions. If w e held that the belief that force w as a necessity m eant that m ass killings of Aborigines was inevitable and hence som ehow an inevitable fate, w e dispense w ith the notion that individuals and states oug h t to be held accountable for their actions, irrespective of w hen those actions w ere com m itted. In Van D iem en's Land prevailing ideas and circum stances helped shape decisions, b u t individuals m ade decisions and com m itted actions. Beliefs, ideas and circum stances m ay pro m p t decisions and help explain subsequent actions, b u t they cannot exonerate individuals from responsibility for those actions, especially in the absence of substantive evidence of self-defence. Just as the Pallittorre w ere not the passive victim s of their invaders, nor w ere the invaders the passive victim s of their ow n beliefs, prejudices and prevailing circum stances. That the Van D iem en's Land A borigines w ere system atically m assacred w as never inevitable; m ass killing by m assacre w as the outcom e of consciously taken decisions.
67 Blainey, 24 July 1993. " King 1990, pp. 13-20; Frost 1992, pp. 4-11 When combined with representations of Aborigines as anachronistic cultural objects, the inevitability argument on both levels-invasion and deaths-is calculated to exonerate past historical actors for responsibility for the mass murder of Aborigines; it serves also to excuse contemporary Australians from the responsibility to provide
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Aborigines with necessary and just human rights, ' usually conceived as some form of land rights, and the provision of basic services such as health care and educational opportunity. The effect of the inevitability argument is to render the decision to invade and the deaths which followed of lesser significance in the destruction of Aboriginal society than the broad historical forces which impelled those lesser, contingent decisions. As did West, Blainey is seeking to swing the pendulum of public opinion away from an acceptance of pre-meditated killing as a major cause of Aboriginal deaths and towards a more comfortable view of the past-that Aborigines lacked both the biological capacity and the cultural sophistication to adapt to the inevitable arrival of a superior western civilisation. Blainey and his predecessor West give us essentially colonial versions of the past; their histories document Australian history as the story of western progress, as the story of broad historical forces to which individual agency is always susceptible; they present historical pasts in which the indigenes are required to assimilate into western culture and society, or perish. Both use their versions of the past to argue, each for his own generation, that neither compensation nor reparation to Aborigines is necessary.
C on clu sion
The historical debate which accompanied the High Court's Mabo decision and the subsequent Native Title Act 1993 is one expression of a contest to control the memories that nourish national consciousness and so shape our future'.73 Given such lofty stakes, it is crucial that positions put by protagonists such as Blainey be challenged, certainly on historical grounds, and on moral grounds too. Both grounds involve questions pertaining to the relevance and methodology of historical scholarship in the field of race relations. In 1990 Peter Read wrote that historians have seldom addressed 'the question of whether we, the present, have any responsibility towards rectifying the deeds of earlier generations'.74 The High Court ruling that '"Australia" is morally illegitimate to the extent that it is founded on European denial of the continent's prior ownership by indigenous people'/3 however, has prompted debate on the issue. While Tim Rowse has expressed the view that such matters are 'endlessly ponderable'76 positions put by Blainey and the moral philosopher Raimond Gaita suggest a polarisation exists. In many ways this debate and the 1996-97 Wik debate, in which the High Court ruled that Native Title and pastoral leases could co-exist 7 suggest the ambivalence which characterised the views of men such as Weston is still evident in Australian society. As might be expected, the focus of these debates is whether or not land should be returned to '2 Rowse 1993 , p. 229. 73 McQueen 1994 , p. 54. 74 Read 1990 , p. 298. 75 Rowse 1993 , p. 229. " Rowse, 1993 For comment on the High Court's Wik decision, see, for example, The Australian, 21 March and 15 April 1997
Aborigines. Blainey does not ad dress the issue of an inherited responsibility, b u t rather points out perceived negative outcom es (in his view) if the responsibility is accepted. Blainey argues th at no further land should be given to A borigines for a num ber of reasons: the average Aborigine has 12 tim es m ore land than the average non-A borigine-an over-sim plification, in m y view , w hich distorts the reality of Aboriginal dispossession; a potential w eakening of the 'sovereignty and unity of the A ustralian people', a claim w hich assum es that such sovereignty and unity actually exists; the threat to econom ic prosperity derived from m ining, a claim for w hich the evidence is contradictory; th at ow nership of land is not vital for the survival of any A ustralian family, an arg u m en t w hich ignores the im portance of land in form ulations of Aboriginal identity; and the H igh C ourt's ap p ro p riatio n of the Parliam ent's right to em body contem porary m oral values in law, a claim w hich forgets that the parliam ent drafted and passed the N ative Title A c t/8 Gaita, on the other hand, argues th at reparation in the form of N ative Title is necessary because nothing less than reparation will redress 'the crim es of our political ancestors' and restore to A borigines their 'full hu m an status', the depth of their 'moral 79 and spiritual being', w hich w as denied by the application of terra nullius and by the ubiquity of the conquest m yth. If the obligation to restore full hum an status to A borigines provides one basis for an arg u m en t for present responsibilty, this paper suggests at least one other. Its illegality aside, one of the m ost m orally culpable aspects of the occupation in Van D iem en's Land, and in fact all of A boriginal A ustralia, w as the persistent choice, w hen taking the land, to em ploy the prom iscuous massacre. M any A borigines w ith w hom I have w orked speak of the en during cultural and personal 80 traum a b equeathed by know ledge of those m assacres. This traum a and the atten d an t moral culpability is intensified by the fact th at in alm ost every other aspect of social life the British invaders rigorously applied the rule of law. As m ost historians w ould know, reparation for w ar crim es is not a novel notion. W hen taken together, the illegal claim to the country, the m orally culpable m eans used to acquire and retain it, and the disastrous consequences for A borigines, w hich persist to this day, provide a very solid basis for the argum en t th at we do have an obligation to rectify past w rongs. In the long run, no am ount of over-sim plified and politically m otivated 'history' will deny that obligation. And herein lies the im portance of local studies.
Local studies enable us to engage w ith the particular, the actual, and the complex, to explore w id er issues at close range, and p erh aps u n d erstand m ore intim ately the living actuality of the time. The arg u m en t th at colonisation in A ustralia w as an abstract force to w hich h u m an s w ere b o u n d to defer, or 'a structure im posed on local practice,81 tends to deny the diversity and com plexity of relations betw een indigenes and colonisers in local places at different 'historical m om ents'.82 This argum ent tends also to deny the level of agency open to the participants in those relations. Similarly, explaining Aboriginal d eaths in term s of the abstraction 'disease' obscures the com plex of w ays and circum stances in w hich indigenous people died. To claim validity, a generalised view M Blainey, 10 November 1993. Gaita, 19 November 1993 . 80 See Cameron and M atson-Green 1994 , p65. w Stoler 1989 ., in Thomas 1994, pl3 . 82 Thomas 1994 , p!4. m ust reflect detailed investigation of local places; it m ust reflect regional variations and sim ilarities, not subvert them to convenient generalisation. Historical opinion, especially on an issue w hich m any observers believe has deep im plications for the moral character of contem porary A ustralian society83 should alw ays proceed from a rigorous historical analysis of available evidence and from generalisations w hich take account of the diversity and com plexity of local experience.
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